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Abstract
In this study, I examine immaterial property rights in an economy
where R&D firms innovate and imitate and households face non-
diversifiable risk. Some property rights postpone the expected time
an innovation will be imitated (e.g. increase the “length” of an in-
novation), while the others protect the imitator’s profits after a suc-
cessful imitation (i.e. increase the “width” of an innovation). The
main findings are as follows. Property rights that generate “short”
and “wide” innovations also speed up economic growth. The smaller
the households’ rate of risk aversion, the “longer” and “narrower” the
welfare-maximizing innovations.
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1 Introduction
In endogenous growth theory with uncertainty, the assumption of the di-
versifiable risk simplifies models considerably. Firms can then borrow any
amount for R&D at a given market interest rate and households are protected
from uncertainly through diversification in the market portfolio. There are
however good reasons to suspect that such an assumption may distort re-
sults. First, it is in contradiction with the whole literature of venture capital
where firms cannot borrow without collateral and use their immaterial prop-
erty (e.g. new ideas) as collateral.1 Second, Wa¨lde (1999a, 1999b) shows
that with non-diversifiable risk investment decisions are made by households
rather than firms which changes the equilibrium conditions substantially. In
this study, I assume that households cannot wholly diversify their invest-
ment risk. Firms must then finance their R&D through issuing shares and
households purchasing these shares face the uncertainly associated with in-
vestment. It is instructive to see how the protection of immaterial property
rights affects economic growth in this case.
In a growth model of creative destruction, firms can step forward in the
quality ladders of technology by investing in R&D. It is assumed that a firm’s
technology is a random variable so that the probability of its improvement
in any time is an increasing function of labor devoted to R&D.2 If imitation
is possible, then economic growth is subject to product cycles as follows.
Through the development of new products, an innovator achieves a tem-
porary advantage earning monopoly profits. This advantage ends when an
imitator succeeds in copying the innovation, enters the market and starts
competing with the innovator. The use of a product cycle model allows us to
distinguish between two kind of property rights: those that (i) prolong the
expected time an innovation will be imitated (e.g. the “length” of an inno-
vation), and those that (ii) protect the imitator’s profits after a successful
imitation (i.e. the “width” of an innovation).
The basis ideas of this paper are the following. At the level of the whole
economy, innovations generate economic growth, but at the level of a sin-
gle firm they are mainly a vehicle of taking over the market. In that case,
1A nice summary of this literature is given by Gompers and Lerner (1999).
2Cf. Grossman and Helpman (1991) (in ch. 4), and Aghion and Howitt (1998).
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oligopolists benefit, but monopolies do not benefit from an innovation, and
a bigger proportion of oligopoly industries leads to greater innovative R&D
and faster economic growth. If the probability of a successful imitation is
small (i.e. innovations are “long”), or if an imitator’s profit is small (i.e. in-
novations are “narrow”), then the expected profit for an imitative investment
is low. In that case, households invest in innovative rather than imitative
R&D projects, firms spend more time as a monopoly and less time as an
innovating oligopoly in their product cycle, and the growth rate decreases.
The literature on the length and width of patents usually assumes di-
versifiable risk.3 In that case, the trade-off between the length and width of
patents can be judged by the present value of investment projects and house-
holds’ rate of risk aversion has no significance. In a product-cycle model with
non-diversifiable risk, there is a trade-off between length and width of innova-
tions through the proportions of innovating and imitating firms in the entire
product cycle. In that case, the socially optimal form of innovations is a
function of the rate of risk aversion.
The analysis is based on my earlier work on competition policy [Palokan-
gas (2006)] that combines Wa¨lde’s (1999a, 1999b) growth model with non-
diversifiable risk with a product cycle model with cumulative technology.4
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure
of the model and section 3 proves the existence of the equilibrium. Section
4 considers the growth effects of property rights and section 5 the socially
optimal length and width of innovations.
2 The model
The basis structure of the model is the following:
1. Labor is homogeneous. There exists a fixed number N of households,
each of which supplies one labor unit. With a competitive labor market,
labor supply N is equal to labor in production, x, and in R&D, l:
N = x+ l. (1)
3For the survey of this literature, cf. Denicolo (1996), Takalo (1998), and Mukherjee
and Pennings (2004).
4Cf. Segerstrom (1991) and Mukoyama (2003).
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2. Because in the model there is no money that would pin down the nomi-
nal price level at any time, it is convenient to normalize the households’
total spending in consumption at unity:
Py = 1, y
.
=
N∑
ι=1
Cι, (2)
where y aggregate consumption, P the consumption price and Cι con-
sumption by household ι ∈ {1, ..., N}.
3. Because R&D firms finance their expenditure by issuing shares and the
households save only in these shares, aggregate income is equal to the
value of consumption, Py, plus wages paid in R&D, wl, where w is the
wage and l labor devoted to R&D. Given (2), it is then true that
N∑
ι=1
Aι = wl + Py = wl + 1, (3)
where Aι is the income of household ι ∈ {1, ..., N} and
∑N
ι=1Aι aggre-
gate income.
4. All households are risk averters and share the same preferences. The
utility for a single household ι ∈ {1, ..., N} from an infinite stream of
consumption Cι beginning at time T is given by
U(Cι, T ) = E
∫ ∞
T
Cσι e
−ρ(t−T )dt with 0 < σ < 1 and ρ > 0, (4)
where t is time, E the expectation operator, ρ the rate of time prefer-
ence and (1− σ) is the constant relative risk aversion.
5. Competitive firms produce the consumption good from a great number
of intermediate goods that are evenly placed over the limit [0, 1]. Each
intermediate good j ∈ [0, 1] is a composite good of the products of a
number nj of firms in industry j ∈ [0, 1]. The first firm is always an
innovator, while the rest κ = 2, ..., nj are imitators. The entry of new
firms through successful imitations decreases the innovator’s market
share.5 Aggregate consumption is then produced from the products xjκ
5I ignore the possibility that firms 3, ..., nj crowd out the market share of the second
firm, for simplicity. Since in equilibrium there will be only two producers per industry,
this would complicate the model without any change in the results.
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of all intermediate-good firms κ ∈ {1, ..., nj} in all industries j ∈ [0, 1]
through Cobb-Douglas technology:
log y =
∫ 1
0
log[Bjxj]dj + log
∫ 1
0
J(nj)dj, J
′(nj) > 0, J(1) = 0,
log xj =
(
1−
nj∑
κ=2
²κ
)
log xj1 +
nj∑
κ=2
²κ log xjκ, ²κ > ²κ+1 for all κ,
(5)
where ²κ is a constant, Bj is the productivity parameter, xj the quantity
of intermediate good j and nj the number of firms in industry j. The
market proportion of the first firm is characterized by 1−∑njκ=2 ²κ and
that of firm κ > 1 by ²κ. The function J(nj) with J
′ > 0 characterizes
the property that a wider variety of products (i.e. a bigger nj) in any
industry provides more services to households and thereby increases a
household’s welfare.6
6. The productivity parameter in industry j [Cf. (5)] is determined by
Bj
.
= µτj , µ > 1, (6)
where µ is a parameter and τj an index of technology in industry j.
The invention of a new technology in industry j raises the index τj by
one and the level of productivity by µ > 1.
7. Each firm doing innovative R&D obtains a spillover of technological
knowledge that is in fixed proportion to total labor devoted to R&D
in the economy, l.7 When firm κ in industry j innovates, its techno-
logical change follows a Poisson process qjκ in which the arrival rate of
innovations, Λjκ, is given by
Λjκ = λl
1−ν
jκ l
ν , λ > 0, 0 < ν < 1, (7)
6In general, the property that product variety increases welfare is commonly established
through a CES production function. In this study, the replacement of the Cobb-Douglas
function (5) by a CES function would excessively complicate the analysis.
7This spillover effect ensures the existence of an equilibrium. If there were no spillover
effect, then ν = 0 holds in (7), the average product of labor would be constant both
in innovative R&D and in imitative R&D, and there would be no interior solution for
a household’s maximization problem (see section 3.5 and Appendix, especially equations
(56) and (57)). With spillover effect ν > 0, the average product of labor is decreasing in
innovative R&D and a household has an interior solution.
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where ljκ is the firm’s own labor input, l the spillover of technological
knowledge, and λ and ν are constants. During a short time interval dt,
there is an innovation dqjκ = 1 in firm κ with probability Λjκdt, and
no innovation dqjκ = 0 with probability 1 − Λjκdt. The parameter λ
characterizes the quality of environment for innovation: the higher λ,
the higher the productivity of investment in innovative R&D.
8. When firm κ in industry j imitates, its technological change follows a
Poisson process Qjκ in which the arrival rate of imitations is in fixed
proportion γ to the firm’s own labor input ljκ:
Γjκ = γljκ for j ∈ Θ, γ > 0. (8)
During a short time interval dt, there is an imitation dQjκ = 1 with
probability Γjκdt, and no imitation dQjκ = 0 with probability 1−Γjκdt.
9. The “width” and “length” of the innovations can be measured as fol-
lows. The larger the innovator’s market share 1−∑njκ=2 ²κ, the less its
profit falls in the advent of a successful imitation and the “wider” the
innovations. The lower the productivity of imitative R&D – i.e. the
smaller γ in (8) – the more time a successful imitation will take and
the “longer” the innovations. Through the regulation of immaterial
property rights, the government determines both ² and γ.
10. Each R&D firm distributes its profit among those who had financed it
in proportion to their investment in the firm. Because both innovation
and imitation follow a Poisson process, the values of shares in R&D
projects are random variables and household ι ∈ {1, ..., N} maximizes
its utility (4) subject to the random development of these values.
3 The steady-state equilibrium
In this section, I prove the existence of the following equilibrium:
Definition. The economy is in a stationary-state equilibrium, if the follow-
ing properties are satisfied:
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(i) The industries j are run either by monopolies (nj = 1) or duopolies (nj =
2). In a monopoly industry outsiders not producing in the industry
imitate, and in a duopoly industry the incumbent duopolists innovate.
(ii) The proportions of monopoly and duopoly industries in the economy
(denoted α and β, respectively) are constants over time. Every time a
new superior-quality product is discovered in some industry, changing
this from a duopoly into a monopoly, imitation must occur in some
other industry, changing this from a monopoly into a duopoly.
(iii) The profits of a typical monopoly and a typical duopolist are constant
over time.
(iv) The wage w and the total output x of a typical industry are constants
over time.
(v) A typical innovating firm’s labor input in R&D, `β, and a typical imi-
tating firm’s labor input in R&D, `α, are constants over time.
3.1 The production of the consumption good
The representative consumption-good firm maximizes its profit
Πc
.
= Py −
∫
j∈[0,1]
nj∑
κ=1
pjκxjκdj
subject to technology (5), given the output price P and the input prices pjκ.
Noting (2), this implies
Πc = 0, pj1 = P
∂y
∂xj1
=
(
1−
nj∑
κ=2
²κ
)
P
y
xj1
=
(
1−
nj∑
κ=2
²κ
)
1
xj1
,
pjκ = P
∂y
∂xjκ
= ²κP
y
xjκ
=
²κ
xjκ
for κ > 1. (9)
3.2 The production of the intermediate goods
All intermediate-good firms produce one unit of their output from one labor
unit. The product of the newest generation provides exactly the constant
µ > 1 times as many services as that of earlier generation. A firm of earlier
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generation earns the profit Πoj = (p
o
j −w)xoj , where poj is its output price and
xoj its output. Every firm with the newest technology pushes and keeps the
firms with older technology out of the market by choosing its price pj so that
these earn no profit, Πoj = 0 and p
o
j = w. This yields pj/µ = p
o
j = w. Noting
this and (9), one obtains the equilibrium conditions:
pj = µw for all j and κ, xjκ =
²κ
pjκ
=
²κ
µw
and
Πjκ = (pjκ − w)xjκ = (1− 1/µ)pjκxjκ = ²κΠ for κ > 1 and all j,
xj1 =
(
1−
nj∑
κ=2
²κ
)
²κ
pj1
=
(
1−
nj∑
κ=2
²κ
)
²κ
µw
for all j,
Πj1 = (pj1 − w)xj1 = (1− 1/µ)pj1xj1 =
(
1−
nj∑
κ=2
²κ
)
Π, (10)
where Π
.
= 1−1/µ > 0 is a constant. Thus, the property (iii) of a stationary-
state equilibrium is proven.
Noting (10), I conclude the following:
(a) The innovator will earn the constant profit Π as long as it remains the
monopoly producer in the industry. Because a household holds the
share of all firms in its same portfolio, it does not invest in innovative
R&D in the monopoly industries.
(b) If a household invests in imitative R&D to enter a monopoly industry
j, then its prospective profit is Πj2, but if it does that (with the same
cost) to enter an industry j with κ > 1 producers, then its prospective
profit is Πj,κ+1 < Πj2. Thus, it invest in imitative R&D only to enter a
monopoly industry, but not to enter an oligopoly industry. This means
that there can be at most two producers in an industry.
From (a) and (b) above it follows that in equilibrium there are only monopoly
industries with imitative R&D or duopoly industries with innovative R&D.
Thus, the property (i) of a stationary-state equilibrium is proven.
I denote the set of monopoly industries by Θ ⊂ [0, 1]. The relative pro-
portion of duopoly industries, β, and the relative proportion of monopoly
industries, α, are then given by
β
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ
dj, α =
∫
j∈Θ
dj = 1− β. (11)
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number of firms
industries1
1
2
α=1−β β
(called R&D firm 0)
(called R&D firms
1 and 2)one imitating outsider
one monopoly, which
neither innovates
nor imitates two innovating
duopolists
Figure 1: Competition and the number of firms in the economy.
Thus, the property (ii) of a stationary-state equilibrium is proven.
3.3 Employment, output and growth
Noting (10) and (11) and summing up throughout industries j ∈ [0, 1] yield
xj = x
.
=
∫
k∈[0,1]
xkdj =
1
µw
. (12)
Given this and (1), the wage w becomes a function of total labor in R&D, l:
w(l) =
1
µx
=
1
µ
1
N − l , w
′ > 0. (13)
Higher demand for labor in R&D (i.e. a bigger l) raises the wage w. This
proves the property (iv) of a stationary-state equilibrium.
According to the properties (i) and (ii) of a stationary-state equilibrium,
duopolists labeled 1 and 2 innovate and none imitates in duopoly industries
j /∈ Θ, while outsiders imitate and none innovates in monopoly industries
j ∈ Θ. Because according to technology (8) imitation yields constant returns
to scale, all outsiders in monopoly industry j ∈ Θ behave as if there were a
single outsider firm labeled 0. The structure of industries is given by Fig. 1.
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Total employment in R&D is given by
l
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj +
∫
j∈Θ
ljdj. (14)
Given (6), the average productivity in the economy, B({tk}), is a function of
the technologies τj of all industries j ∈ [0, 1] as follows:
log B({tk}) .=
∫ 1
0
log Bjdj = (log µ)
∫ 1
0
τjdj. (15)
The arrival rate of innovations in industry j /∈ Θ is the sum of the arrival
rates of both duopolists in that industry, Λj1 + Λj2 [Cf., (7)]. From (1), (5),
(12) and (15) it follows that aggregate consumption y is given by
y = xB({tk}) = (N − l)B({tk}). (16)
Because only duopoly industries j /∈ Θ innovate, then the average growth
rate of the average productivity B({tk}) in the stationary state is given by
g
.
= (log µ)
∫ 1
0
Pr(τj increases by one)dj = (log µ)
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj, (17)
where Pr(·) denotes the probability.
3.4 Innovation and imitation
In monopoly industry j ∈ Θ outsider 0 and in industry j /∈ Θ duopolists 1
and 2 issue shares to finance their labor expenditure in R&D. Because the
households ι ∈ {1, ..., N} invest in these shares, one obtains
N∑
ι=1
Sιj0 = wlj0 for j ∈ Θ,
N∑
ι=1
Sιjκ = wljκ for κ ∈ {1, 2} and j /∈ Θ, (18)
where wlj0 is the imitative expenditure of outsider 0 in monopoly industry j ∈
Θ, wljκ the innovative expenditure of duopolist κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j /∈ Θ,
Sιj0 household ι’s investment in outsider firm 0 in monopoly industry j ∈ Θ,
Sιjκ household ι’s investment in duopolist κ in industry j /∈ Θ,
∑N
ι=1 Sιj0
aggregate investment in outsider firm 0 in monopoly industry j ∈ Θ, and
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∑N
ι=1 Sιjκ aggregate investment in duopolist κ in industry j /∈ Θ. Household
ι’s relative investment shares in outsiders 0 and duopolists κ ∈ {1, 2} are
iιj0
.
=
Sιj0
wlj0
for j ∈ Θ; iιjκ .= Sιjκ
wljκ
for j /∈ Θ. (19)
When household ι has financed a successful R&D firm, it acquires the
right to the firm’s profit in proportion to its relative investment share. The
profit sharing in the economy can then be characterized as follows:
sιjκ household ι’s profit from duopolist κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j /∈ Θ when
the uncertainty in R&D is taken into account;
iιjκ household ι’s investment share in duopolist κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j /∈ Θ
[Cf. (19)];
Πj1 the profit of duopolist κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j /∈ Θ after innovation
have changed it into a monopoly;
Πj1iιjκ household ι’s profit from duopolist κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j /∈ Θ after
innovation have changed this into a monopoly;
sιj0 household ι’s profit from outsider 0 in industry j ∈ Θ when the uncer-
tainty in R&D is taken into account;
iιjκ household ι’s investment share in outsider 0 in industry j ∈ Θ [Cf.
(19)];
Πj2 the profit of outsider 0 in industry j ∈ Θ after imitation have changed
it as the second duopolist;
Πj2iιj0 household ι’s profit from outsider 0 in industry j ∈ Θ after imitation
have changed it into the second duopolist.
The changes in the profits of firms in industry j are functions of the
increments (dqj1, dqj2, dQj0) of Poisson processes (qj1, qj2, Qj0) as follows:
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dsιjκ = (Πj1iιjκ − sιjκ)dqjκ − sιjκdqj(ζ 6=κ) when j /∈ Θ;
dsιj0 = (Πj2iιj0 − sιj0)dQj0 when j ∈ Θ. (20)
8This extends the idea of Wa¨lde (1999a, 1999b).
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These functions can be explained as follows. If a household invests in inno-
vating duopolist κ in industry j /∈ Θ, then, in the advent of a success for
that duopolist, dqjκ = 1, the amount of its share holdings rises up to Πj1iιjκ,
dsιjκ = Πiιjκ − sιjκ, but in the advent of success for the other duopolist
ζ 6= κ, its share holdings in duopolist κ fall down to zero, dsιjκ = −sιjκ.
If a household invests in imitating outsider 0 in monopoly industry j ∈ Θ,
then, in the advent of a success for firm 0, dQj0 = 1, the amount of its share
holdings rises up to Πj2iιj0, dsιj0 = pi2iιj0 − sιj0.
3.5 Households
Because investment in shares in R&D firms is the only form of saving in the
model, the budget constraint of household ι is given by
Aι = PCι +
∫
j∈Θ
Sιj0dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(Sιj1 + Sιj2)dj, (21)
where Aι is the household’s total income, Cι its consumption, P the consump-
tion price, Sιj0 the household’s investment in outsider firm 0 in monopoly
industry j ∈ Θ, and Sιjκ the household’s investment in duopolist κ in indus-
try j /∈ Θ. Household ι’s total income Aι consists of its wage income w (the
household supplies one labor unit), its profits sιj1 from the monopoly in each
industry j ∈ Θ and its profits sιj1 and sιj2 from the duopolists 1 and 2 in
each industry j /∈ Θ. This yields
Aι = w +
∫
j∈Θ
sιj1dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(sιj1 + sιj2)dj. (22)
Household ι maximizes its utility (4) by its investment, {Sιj0} for j ∈ Θ
and {Sιj1, Sιj2} for j /∈ Θ, subject to its budget constraint (21), the stochas-
tic changes (20) in its profits, the composition of its income, (22), and the
determination of its relative investment shares, (19), given the arrival rates
{Λjκ,Γj0}, the wage w and the consumption price P . In the households’ sta-
tionary equilibrium in which the allocation of resources is invariable across
technologies, this maximization yields (see the Appendix):
ljκ = `β = ξl for j /∈ Θ,
lj0 = `α =
1−2βξ
1−β l for j ∈ Θ,
ξ
.
= µσ/ν
(λ
ε
)1/ν
,
ε
.
= γ²2, (23)
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ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g = ∆(l)ε, ∆′ < 0, (24)
g = (2λ log µ)βξ1−νl = (2λ log µ)βµ(1/ν−1)σ(λ/ε)1/ν−1l, (25)
where `α (`β) is employment per firm in imitative (innovative) R&D and ε
the extent of property rights (= the “width” ²2 times the “length” γ for an
innovation). The results (23)-(25) can be explained as follows:
(23) With “wider” and “longer” innovations (i.e. a smaller ε
.
= γ²2), house-
holds invest more in innovative R&D to escape the competition and
`β/l rises. Because of the spillover effect,
9 inputs in innovative R&D,
`β, and imitative R&D, `α, are proportional to total labor in R&D, l.
(24) A household’s subjective discount factor ρ + 1−µ
σ
log µ
g is equal to the
marginal rate of return to savings, ∆ε, which is proportional to the
extent of property rights, ε, and decreases with an increase in labor
input l to R&D.
(25) The growth rate g is in fixed proportion to aggregate labor devoted
to R&D, l. A higher number of innovating industries (i.e. a bigger β)
increases this proportion and thereby promotes growth.
Given (23), the property (v) of a stationary-state equilibrium is proven. The
equation (24) defines the function
l(g, ε),
∂l
∂ε
= − ∆
ε∆′
> 0,
ε
l
∂l
∂ε
= − ∆(l)
l∆′(l)
.
= η(l) > 0,
g
l
∂l
∂g
=
1− µσ
ε log µ
g
l∆′
=
µσ − 1
ε log µ
ηg
∆
=
µσ − 1
log µ
g
[
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g
]−1
η(l) > 0. (26)
4 The product cycle
Given the property (ii) of the stationary-state equilibrium, the rate at which
industries leave the group of duopoly industries k /∈ Θ in a small interval dt,
β(Λj1 + Λj2)dt, is then equal to the rate at which the industries leave the
9See assumption 7 in section 2.
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group of monopoly industries j ∈ Θ, αΓj0dt in that interval dt. This implies
the equilibrium condition
β(Λk1 + Λk2) = αΓj0 for k /∈ Θ and j ∈ Θ. (27)
From equations (11), (7), (8), (23) and (27) it follows that
1 =
Λk1 + Λk2
αΓj0/β
=
λ(l1−νk1 + l
1−ν
k2 )l
ν
(1− β)γlj0/β =
2λ`1−νβ l
ν
(1− β)γ`α/β =
2λξ1−ν/γ
1/β − 2 ξ .
Solving for β from this equation yields
β
.
=
1
2
[
ξ +
λ
γ
ξ1−ν
]−1
.
(28)
From (23), (25) and (28) it follows that
g
l(g, ε)
= (2λ log µ)βξ1−ν =
λ log µ
ξν + λ/γ
=
log µ
µσ/ε+ 1/γ
.
= θ(γ, ε),
∂θ/∂γ > 0, ∂θ/∂ε > 0. (29)
Unfortunately, the variable g appears in both sides of the equation (25),
which makes the outcome ambiguous. For this reason, I assume the following
stability property for the equation (25).10 After a small perturbation θl− g,
the actual growth rate of the economy, g, adjusts to its equilibrium level θl
according to an increasing function δ of the perturbation θl − g:
dg/dt = δ
(
θ(γ, ε)l(g, ε)− g
)
.
= Υ(g, γ, ε), δ′ > 0, δ(0) = 0, (30)
where the stability of the system requires ∂Υ/∂g < 0. Noting (23), (26),
(28), (29) and (30), we obtain
∂Υ
∂γ
= δ′︸︷︷︸
+
l
∂θ
∂γ︸︷︷︸
+
> 0,
∂Υ
∂ε
= δ′︸︷︷︸
+
[
l
∂θ
∂ε︸︷︷︸
+
+θ
∂l
∂ε︸︷︷︸
+
]
> 0.
Given this, (28) and (30), the equilibrium with dg/dt = 0 defines the function
g = G(γ, ε),
∂G
∂γ
= −∂Υ
∂γ
/
∂Υ
∂g
> 0,
∂G
∂ε
= −∂Υ
∂ε
/
∂Υ
∂g
> 0. (31)
This result can be rephrased as follows:
10Cf. Dixit (1986), for the use of stability properties in refining comparative statics.
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Proposition 1 The more extensive property rights (i.e. the higher ε), or
the more these favor “short” innovations (i.e. a big γ), the faster growth.
Property rights increase rewards for innovations and the growth rate. With
“shorter” innovations, firms spend shorter periods as a monopoly and longer
periods as a duopolist, which increases the proportion β of duopoly industries.
Because only duopolists innovate, this boosts innovation and growth.
5 Public policy
Noting (23), the equation (25) can be written also as follows:
β
.
=
gξν−1
(2λ log µ)l(g, ε)
=
gµ(1−1/ν)σε1/ν−1
(2 log µ)λ1/νl(g, ε)
. (32)
The symmetry across the households ι = 1, ..., n yields Cι = y/N . Noting
Cι = y/N , (11), (16), (26) and (32), a single household’s consumption relative
to the level of productivity, c
.
= Cι/B({tk}), can be written as follows:
c(g, ε)
.
=
Cι
B({tk}) =
y/N
B({tk}) =
[
αJ(1) + βJ(2)
](
1− l
N
)
= βJ(2)
(
1− l
N
)
=
J(2)gµ(1−1/ν)σε1/ν−1
(2 log µ)λ1/ν
[
1
l(g, ε)
− 1
N
]
,
g
c
∂c
∂g
= 1− N
N − l
g
l
∂l
∂g
. (33)
Noting this and (31), a single household’s utility function (4) takes the form
U(Cι, T ) = E
∫ ∞
T
c(g, ε)σB({tk})σe−ρ(ν−T )dν. (34)
Given ε
.
= ²γ and (31), the government controls the growth rate g and the
extent of property rights, ε, by the “width” and “length” of the innovations,
²2 and γ. It chooses ε and g to maximize a household’s welfare (34) subject
to stochastic technological change (7). I denote by Υ({tk}) the value of any
industry using current technology tk, and by Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
the value of
industry j using technology tj + 1, when other industries k 6= j use current
technology tk. In each duopoly industry j /∈ Θ, the arrival rate of innovations
that change technology from tj to tj+1 is equal to Λj1+Λj2, while there are no
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innovations in monopoly industries j ∈ Θ. Noting this, the Bellman equation
corresponding to the government’s maximization problem is given by11
ρΥ({tk}) = max
g,,ε,λ
F(g, ε), where
F(g, ε, λ) .= c(g, ε)
σ
B({tk})−σ +
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)
[
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)−Υ({tk})]dj.
Because in equilibrium technological change is symmetric throughout all in-
novating industries, Υ
(
tj+1, {tk 6=j}
)−Υ({tk}) = Υ(tι+1, {tk 6=ι})−Υ({tk})
for j /∈ Θ, then, noting (17), this Bellman equation changes into
ρΥ({tk}) = max
g,ε
F(g, ε, λ), where
F(g, ε, λ) = c(g, ε)
σ
B({tk})−σ +
[
Υ
(
tι + 1, {tk 6=ι}
)−Υ({tk})] ∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj
=
c(g, ε)σ
B({tk})−σ +
[
Υ
(
tι + 1, {tk 6=ι}
)−Υ({tk})] g
log µ
. (35)
5.1 The optimal extent of property rights
Noting (33) and (35), one obtains
ε = argmax
ε
F(g, ε, λ) = argmax
ε
c(g, ε, λ) = argmax
ε
{
ε1/ν−1
[
1/l − 1/N ]}
= argmax
ε
{
(1/ν − 1) log ε+ log[1/l(g, ε)− 1/N]}. (36)
This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 2 The extent of property rights, ε, should be chosen to maxi-
mize current consumption c holding the level of productivity, B, constant.
More extensive property rights (i.e. a higher ε) (i) decrease the variety of
products and the index of consumption, but (ii) diminishes imitation, which
releases resources from R&D to consumption. The opposite effects (i) and (ii)
are in balance when the extent of property rights maximizes consumption.
Noting (26), the first-order condition for the maximization in (36) is
0 =
∂{}
∂ε
=
(1
ν
− 1
)1
ε
− N/l
N − l
∂l
∂ε
=
1
ν
[
1
ν
− 1− Nη(l)
N − l
]
11Cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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and
Nη(l)/(N − l) = 1/ν − 1. (37)
This defines total labor in R&D as a function of the spillover parameter ν:
l(ν). (38)
5.2 The optimal growth rate
I try the solution that the value function is of the form
Υ({tk}) = cσB({tk})σ/ϑ (39)
where ϑ is independent of the endogenous variables of the system. From (6),
(15) and (39) it then follows that
Υ
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
Υ({tk}) =
(
B
(
tj + 1, {tk 6=j}
)
B({tk})
)σ
=
(
Bj(tj + 1)
Bj(tj)
)σ
= µσ. (40)
Inserting (39) and (40) into the Bellman equation (35), we obtain
ρ = ϑ+ (µσ − 1)
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj = ϑ+ (µ
σ − 1) g
log µ
and
ϑ = ρ− µ
σ − 1
log µ
g. (41)
Noting (26), (33), (37), (39), (40) and (41), the first-order condition corre-
sponding to g in the maximization (35) is given by
∂F
∂g
= σcσ−1Bσ
∂c
∂g
+
µσ − 1
log µ
Υ({tk}) =
[
ϑ
g
c
∂c
∂g
+
µσ − 1
σ log µ
g
]
σ
g
Υ({tk})
=
[
ϑ− ϑN
N − l
g
l
∂l
∂g
+
µσ − 1
σ log µ
g
]
σ
g
Υ({tk})
=
[
ρ+
( 1
σ
− 1
)µσ − 1
log µ
g − ϑN
N − l
g
l
∂l
∂g
]
σ
g
Υ({tk})
=
[
ρ
g
+
( 1
σ
− 1
ν
)µσ − 1
log µ
]
σΥ({tk}) = 0.
This yields the optimal growth rate
g(ρ, σ, ν)
.
=
(log µ)ρ
(µσ − 1)(1/ν − 1/σ) ,
∂g
∂σ
< 0, (42)
for which g > 0 if and only if σ > ν. These results can be rephrased as:
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Proposition 3 The optimal growth rate is the higher, the more risk averse
the households (i.e. the smaller σ). The economy has persistent growth only
if the spillover effect is not too large (i.e. ν < σ holds true).
When households are more risk averse (i.e. a bigger RRA 1−σ and a smaller
σ), they claim a higher rate of return, ρ+ 1−µ
σ
log µ
g, on their investment in R&D.
Because the true rate of return on R&D cannot raise that much, the optimal
growth rate g must increase. When spillover of knowledge is too extensive,
ν ≥ σ, growth accelerates, i.e. there is no stable growth path.
5.3 The optimal “width” and “length” of innovations
Inserting (38) and (42) into (24) and solving for ε yield
ε(ρ, σ, ν)
.
=
(
1− 1
1/ν − 1/σ
)
ρ
∆(l(ν))
,
∂ε
∂σ
> 0. (43)
Using (31) and (43), one obtains an equation that determines the optimal
“length” of innovations, γ: g
(
ρ, σ, ν
)
= G(γ, ε(ρ, σ, ν)). Differentiating this
equation totally and noting (23), (31), (42) and (43) yield
γ(ρ, σ, ν),
∂γ
∂σ
.
=
(
∂g
∂σ
− ∂G
∂ε
∂ε
∂σ
)/
∂G
∂γ
< 0,
²2(ρ, σ, ν)
.
=
ε(ρ, σ, ν)
γ(ρ, σ, ν)
,
∂²2
∂σ
.
=
1
γ
(
∂ε
∂σ
− ε
γ
∂γ
∂σ
)
> 0.
These results can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 4 The less risk averse the households (i.e. the greater σ), the
“longer” (i.e. the smaller γ) and the “narrower” (i.e. the greater ²2) the
welfare-maximizing innovations.
Where households are only a little risk averse, the welfare-maximizing growth
rate is low [cf. proposition 3] and innovations must be taylored “long” and
“narrow” to maintain this growth rate [cf. proposition 1].
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6 Conclusions
This study examines a multi-industry economy in which growth is generated
by creative destruction. In each industry, a firm that creates the newest
technology by a successful innovation crowds out the other firms with older
technologies from the market and becomes the first producer of the industry.
A firm creating a copy of the newest technology starts producing a close sub-
stitute for the innovator’s product and establishes an innovation race with the
first producer. Because systematic investment risk cannot be eliminated by
diversification, the households hold the shares of all firms in their portfolios.
The main findings of this study are as follows.
Because monopolies have no incentives to innovate, the growth rate in-
creases with the proportion of duopoly industries. With non-diversifiable
risk, the “width” and “shortness” of innovations boost economic growth. In
that case, firms spend shorter periods as a monopoly and the proportion of
innovating duopoly industries increases. Property rights decrease the variety
of products and the index of consumption, but decrease also imitation, which
releases resources from R&D to consumption. When these opposite effects
are in balance, there is an optimal extent of property rights.
The optimal growth rate is the higher, the more risk averse the house-
holds. More risk averse households claim a higher rate of return on their
investment in R&D. Because the true rate of return on R&D cannot raise
that much, the growth rate must increase to keep households’ claims down.
Moderate spillover of knowledge boosts growth. With too large spillover
growth accelerates, i.e. there is no stable growth path.
The less risk averse households, the “longer” and the “narrower” the
welfare-maximizing innovations. Where households are only a little risk
averse, the welfare-maximizing growth rate is low. To maintain that low
growth rate, innovations must be taylored “long” and “narrow” .
Appendix
I denote:
Ω
({sιkυ}, {τk}) the value of receiving profits sιkυ from all firms υ in all in-
dustries k using current technology τk.
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Ω
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, τj + 1, {τk 6=j}
)
the value of receiving the profit Πiιjκ
from firm κ in industry j /∈ Θ using technology τj +1, but receiving no
profits from the other firm which was a producer in that industry when
technology τj was used, and receiving profits sι(k 6=j)υ from all firms υ
in other industries k 6= j with current technology τk.
Ω
(
pi2iιj1, pi2iιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {τk}
)
the value of receiving profits pi2iιjκ from firms
κ ∈ {1, 2} in industry j ∈ Θ, but receiving profits sι(k 6=j)υ from all firms
υ in the other industries k 6= j with current technology τk.
The Bellman equation associated with the household’s maximization is12
ρΩ
({sιkυ}, {τk}) = max
Sιj ≥ 0 for all j
Ξι (44)
with
Ξι
.
= Cσι +
∫
j∈Θ
Γj0
[
Ω
(
pi2iιj1, pi2iιj1, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {τk}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {τk})]dj
+
∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
Λjκ
[
Ω
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, τj + 1, {τk 6=j}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {τk})]dj,
(45)
where Λjκ is the arrival rate of innovations for duopolist κ in industry j /∈ Θ
and Γj0 the arrival rate of imitations for outsider 0 in industry j ∈ Θ. Because
∂Cι/∂Sιjκ = −1/P by (21), the first-order conditions are given by
Λjκ
d
dSιjκ
[
Ω
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, τj + 1, {τk 6=j}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {τk})] = σ
P
Cσ−1ι
for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2}, (46)
Γj0
d
dSιj0
[
Ω
(
pi2iιj1, pi2iιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {τk}
)− Ω({sιkυ}, {τk})] = σ
P
Cσ−1ι
for j ∈ Θ. (47)
I try the solution that for each household ι the propensity to consume,
hι, and the subjective interest rate rι are independent of income Aι, i.e.
PCι = hιAι and Ω = C
σ
ι /rι. I denote variables depending on technology τj
by superscript τj and a vector that consists of tk for all k by {tk}. Since
12Cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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according to (22) income A
{τk}
ι depends directly on variables {sτkιk}, I denote
A
{τk}
ι ({sτkιk}). Assuming that hι is invariant across technologies yields
P {τk}C{τk}ι = hιA
{τk}
ι ({sτkιk}). (48)
The share in the next innovator τj+1 is determined by investment under the
present technology τj, s
τj+1
ιjκ = Πi
τj
ιjκ for j /∈ Θ. The share in the next imitator
is determined by investment under the same technology τj, s
τj
ιjκ = pi2i
τj
ιjκ for
j ∈ Θ. The value functions are then given by
Ω
({sιkυ}, {τk}) = Ω(pi2iιj1, pi2iιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {τk}) = 1
rι
(
C{τk}ι
)σ
,
Ω
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, τj + 1, {τk 6=j}
)
=
1
rι
(
C
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
)σ
. (49)
Given this, one obtains
∂Ω
({sιkυ}, {τk})
∂S
τj
ιj
= 0. (50)
From (19), (22), (48), (49), s
τj+1
ιjκ = Πi
τj
ιjκ for j /∈ Θ, and sτjιjκ = pi2iτjιjκ for
j ∈ Θ it follows that
∂s
τj+1
ιjκ
∂i
τj
ιjκ
= Π for j /∈ Θ, ∂s
τj
ιj0
∂i
τj
ιj0
= pi2 for j ∈ Θ, ∂A
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
∂s
τj+1
ιjκ
=
∂A
{τk}
ι
∂s
τj
ιjκ
= 1,
∂i
τj
ιj0
∂S
τj
ιj0
=
1
w{τk}l{τk}j0
for j ∈ Θ, ∂i
τj
ιjκ
∂S
τj
ιjκ
=
1
w{τk}l{τk}jκ
for j /∈ Θ,
dΩ
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, τj + 1, {τk 6=j}
)
dS
τj
ιjκ
=
σ
rι
(
C
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1 ∂Cτj+1,{τk 6=j}ι
∂A
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι︸ ︷︷ ︸
hι/P
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
∂A
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
∂s
τj+1
ιjκ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
∂s
τj+1
ιjκ
∂i
τj
ιjκ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=pi2
∂i
τj
ιjκ
∂S
τj
ιjκ
=
Πσhι
(
C
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1
rιP τj+1,{τk 6=j}
∂i
τj
ιjκ
∂S
τj
ιjκ
=
Πhισ
(
C
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1
rιw{τk}P τj+1,{τk 6=j}l
{τk}
jκ
for j /∈ Θ, (51)
dΩ
(
pi2iιj1, pi2iιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {τk}
)
dS
τj
ιj0
=
σ
rι
(
C{τk}ι
)σ−1 ∂C{τk}ι
∂A
{τk}
ι︸ ︷︷ ︸
=hι/P {τk}
∂A
{τk}
ι
s
τj
ιj0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
s
τj
ιj0
∂iτιj0︸ ︷︷ ︸
=pi2
∂iτιj0
∂Stιj0
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=
pi2σhι
rιP {τk}
(
C{τk}ι
)σ−1 ∂iτιj0
∂Stιj0
=
pi2hισ
(
C
{τk}
ι
)σ−1
rιw{τk}P {τk}l
{τk}
j0
for j ∈ Θ. (52)
I focus on a stationary equilibrium where the growth rate g and the
allocation of labor, (ljκ, x), are invariant across technologies. Given (9),
(13), (15) and (1), this implies
l
{τk}
jκ = ljκ, x
{τk} = x = N − l, w{τk} = w = x/ϕ,
P {τk}
P τj+1,{τk 6=j}
=
C
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
C
{τk}
ι
=
A
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
A
{τk}
ι
=
yτj+1,{τk 6=j}
y{τk}
=
Bτj+1,{τk 6=j}
B{τk}
= µ.
(53)
Inserting (17), (45), (48), (49), (53) and g
.
=
∫
j /∈Θ ljdj into (44) yields
0 =
[
ρ+
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj +
∫
j∈Θ
Γj0dj
]
Ω
({sιkυ}, {τk})− (C{τk}ι )σ
−
∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
ΛjκΩ
(
Πiιjκ, 0, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, τj + 1, {τk 6=j}
)
dj
−
∫
j∈Θ
Γj0Ω
(
pi2iιj1, pi2iιj2, {sι(k 6=j)υ}, {τk}
)
dj
=
[
ρ+
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj
](C{τk}ι )σ
rι
− (C{τk}ι )σ − ∫
j /∈Θ
∑
κ=1,2
Λjκ
µσ
rι
(
C{τk}ι
)σ
dj
=
1
rι
(
C{τk}ι
)σ[
ρ− rι + 1− µ
σ
log µ
g
]
.
This equation is equivalent to
rι = ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g. (54)
Because there is symmetry throughout all households ι, their propensity
to consume is equal, hι = h. This, (18), (3), (21), (22) and (48) yield
wl = w
∫
j∈Θ
lj0dj + w
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj = w
∫
j∈Θ
lj0dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj
=
N∑
ι=1
[∫
j∈Θ
Sιj0dj +
∫
j /∈Θ
(Sιj1 + Sιj2)dj
]
=
N∑
ι=1
(Aι − PCι) = (1− h)
N∑
ι=1
Aι
= (1− h)(1 + wl)
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and
hι = h = (1 + wl)
−1. (55)
Inserting (7), (8), (50), (51), (52), (53), (54), (55) and ε
.
= γ² into (46)
and (47), one obtains
Πhσµσ
(
C
{τk}
ι
)σ−1
λ(l/ljκ)
ν(
ρ+ 1−µ
σ
log µ
g
)
wP {τk}
=
σΠhιµ
σΛjκ
(
C
{τk}
ι
)σ−1
rιwljκP {τk}
=
σΠhιΛjκ
(
C
τj+1,{τk 6=j}
ι
)σ−1
rιwljκP
ττj+1,{τk 6=j}
= Λjκ
d
dSιjκ
Ω
(
Πiιj, {sι(k 6=j)}, τj + 1, {τk 6=j}
)
=
σ
P {τk}
(
C{τk}ι
)σ−1
for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2}, (56)
εΠhσ
(
C
{τk}
ι
)σ−1(
ρ+ 1−µ
σ
log µ
g
)
wP {τk}
=
σ²Πhιγ
(
C
{τk}
ι
)σ−1
rιwP {τk}
=
σpi2hιΓj0
(
C
{τk}
ι
)σ−1
rιwlj0P {τk}
= Γj0
d
dSιj0
Ω
({pi2iιj1, pi2iιj2, {sιm(k 6=j)}, {τk}) = σ
P {τk}
(
C{τk}ι
)σ−1
for j ∈ Θ.
(57)
Given µ > 1, pi2 ≤ Π/2, (56) and (57), one obtains
ljκ = `β for j /∈ Θ,
lj0 = `α for j ∈ Θ,
`β
l
= ξ(ε)
.
=
(
µσλ
ε
)1/ν
. (58)
Equations (11), (13), (7), (14), (17), (55), (57) and (58) yield
l =
∫
j /∈Θ
(lj1 + lj2)dj +
∫
j∈Θ
ljdj = 2`β
∫
j /∈Θ
dj + `α
∫
j∈Θ
dj
= (1− β)`α + 2β`β = (1− β)`α + 2βξl,
`α = [1− 2βξ(ε)]l/(1− β), (59)
Λjκ = λl
1−ν
jκ l
ν = λ`1−νβ l
ν = λξ(ε)1−νl for j /∈ Θ and κ ∈ {1, 2},
g = (log µ)
∫
j /∈Θ
(Λj1 + Λj2)dj = (2 log µ)βΛjκ = (2λ log µ)βξ(ε)
1−νl, (60)
ρ+
1− µσ
log µ
g =
hε
w
Π =
εΠ
[1 + w(l)l]w(l)
.
= ∆(l)ε, ∆′ < 0. (61)
Equations (58)-(61) define (23)-(25).
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